INTUITIVE AWARENESS: ISSUES IN EA R L Y MYSTICISM N A K A M U R A Hajime N E G A T IV E THINKING
The main currents of medieval thought were shaped by dogmatics.
In the cultural sphere of the Buddhist Far East Vasubandhu (ca. 320-400) and Buddhaghosa were the great compilers of Abhidharma dogmatics, while in Europe a corresponding development took place in positive theology that shows a strong Abhidharma flavor. This theology defined and systematized the truth of faith embodied in the teachings of the Church, i.e., in scripture, tradition, and the dogmatic definitions, laying the foundation for speculative theol ogy. The beginnings of this systematization appeared in Peter Lombard and its methodology was established by Dionysius Petavius.
At the same time, a contrasting development was taking place in the form of negative theology, principally represented by the works of Pseudo-Dionysius (that is, those falsely ascribed to Diony sius the Aereopagite). The author of these texts complemented the positive language of the first way of affirmative theology (totaphatike theologia) by a second, higher way of negative theology (apophatike theologia)9 thereby evolving a third way through which negative theology led to an encounter with God in ecstasy through mystic immersion in superessential light. This negative apophatic For the Asian analogue of this negative approach we must first turn our attention to the mystics of Mahayana Buddhism who taught the principle of emptiness.
EMPTINESS: THE DENIAL OF ESSENCE
Mahayana Buddhism based its insight into emptiness (^unyata) on the notion that all phenomena exist in interdependency. The root of the term ざ inya (empty) means ,Tto be swollen, to be hollow," for something that is swollen is hollow (op empty) on the interior. The Sanskrit term ^unya also refers to the modern mathematical symbol for zero. 2 The translators of the Chinese Buddhist canon rendered it through a character meaning T t void s k y " 空 . By contrast, the West did not evince such a full-fledged denial of essence. When it did, the force of the denial was greatly dimin ished by the Aristotelian idea of essence which held sway for a long period of time. We may note here the criticism of Bertrand Russell against this notion of the Aristotelian essence which had flourished for so long in the West: "Substance," when taken seriously, is a concept impossible to free from difficulties. A substance is supposed to be the subject of properties, and to be something distinct from all its properties. But when we take away the properties, and try to imagine the substance by itself, we find that there is nothing left. When mental activity ceases there are no referents for language. Reality neither arises nor passes away, in fact it is like cessation (18.7).
Despite the fact that the ancient Western philosophers did in some sense admit the existence of essences, the opinion that it is impos sible for those essences to be conceptually apprehended appeared It is also possible to find notions that parallel emptiness as the ultimate principle in ancient China. The Lao Tza says：
The tao is always non-active; thus neither is it not active (37:4).
One can indeed discuss whether the Buddhist notion of emptiness parallels the Taoist "empty nothingness" 虚 無 , but as a matter of fact those who introduced Buddhism into China did consider them to be identical, as shown in a passage from The Larger Sakhavati- proposition until it could be proved to be Nagapjuna!s argumentation in negating motion has frequently been compared to Zeno's. Similarities between these two thinkers have often been pointed out, particularly the similarity in their refutation of motion. But there are fundamental differences between Zeno and Nagarjuna. The criticism has been leveled at Nagarjuna that "his negative judgment is a negation of judgment.T T 18 This amounts to the claim that the Madhyamika negation of movement is, properly speaking, the negation of the affirmative judgment about movement. But we should note that his whole criti cism of the notion of movement does not deal with the judgment about motion, but about motion taken in a most "realistic way.f|19
Some of Nagarjuna's arguments would appear to be sophistry, but are in fact attempts to break through an essentialist way of thinking, especially in the well-known version of the Sarvastivada school. Such a criticism also appears in the Platonic Dialogues. If there is no empty thing that exists, then emptiness as such ophers. According to Cicero, the skeptics were people who T t sanctioned nothing as proved (qui nihil p r o b a r e n t ) . tf3 2 This position also resembles that of Madhyamika, which considered the method of reductio ad absurdum (prasanga) to be the correct one. The Roman skeptics also report arguments based on the reductio ad absurdum.
As for wisdom herself, if she does not know whether she is wisdom or not, how in the first place will she make good her claim to the name of wisdom? Next, how will she venture with confidence to plan or execute any undertaking when there will be nothing certain for her to act upon?
How can wisdom, while not knowing the final, ultimate good on which all things depend, acquit herself in practice?" According to Cicero, the wise person (sapiens) "avoids being taken in and sees to it that he is not deceived,T T and the sceptics held that "nothing can be perceived" or grasped (comprehendi) , an idea that parallels the teaching of the Prajflaparamita on the unattain able (anupalabdhi). This attitude is expressed in the phrase, nthe wise man will restrain all acts of assent1 1 (adsensust abhinive^a).
We also find this attitude employed in Mahayana Buddhism. Again Cicero mentions the "perversity" (pravitas) of seeing the non-real as real,a condition the Buddhists called inverted thinking (viparyasa) . Furthermore Cicero takes a position against the senses, which are said to be T T full of darkness, and argues against "everything that is approved in common experience (consuetudosam vrti)^^ These attitudes also characterized Nagarjuna and Aryadeva. In Mahayana Buddhism it is taught by the Diamond Sutra that:
One cannot see Buddha through his physical marks. All those marks are empty and vacuous-those varied marks are no marks and he who sees thus is he who sees Tathagata.
In such a Tathagata, there is no enunciation of doctrine. Later this feminine principle was converted into a metaphysical principle. Indian prajfia not only became the womb for all good qualities, but was also regarded as the Buddha-mother (BhagavaO) that gave birth to all Buddhas, in much the same way that the Western Sophia came to be regarded as the source of all creation.
A BASIS F O R PRACTICE
Those who delight in this logic of negation direct their practice toward separation from all attachments and hindrances and make this their life goal. Plato was a rather typical moralist of a vigorous ascetic bent, not a theoretical skeptic. Unmoved by worldly affairs, he strove constantly to cultivate an aloofness from his surroundings.36 The same can be said of numerous Buddhist and Hindu saints. In ancient India the question arose as to whether those who advocated emptiness (iunyavadin) were nihilists (nastifca). The Mahayana position was that the doctrine of empti ness did not advocate nihilism. Emptiness is rather the principle that established everything. It represents both the ultimate realm and a foundation for practice, whence the Mahayana insistence that it is the true ground upon which ethical value is constructed.
In emptiness nothing exists, and yet all things come from empti ness. It is like a mirror in which everything can be reflected because nothing exists in it.
The likening of the consciousness of direct religious insight and wisdom to images reflected in a mirror, the simile of the mirror as a medium reflecting the sacred, is found in China and India, in Buddhism, in Greece, and in Christianity.^^ In Mahayana, especially in VijHaptimatrata, the wisdom realized through the conversion of the alaya consciousness that forms the basis for our existence is termed "mirror wisdom." In the history of Chinese ChTan, we read of the monk Shen Hsiu who understood the realiza tion of enlightenment as the removal of dust from the surface of a mirror, in contrast to which the Sixth Patriarch, Hui Neng, advo cated that the Buddha-nature had no need for any cleansing because it is originally pure-a point that subsequently became orthodox Ch!an doctrine， But we must not forget that no matter how valued and esteemed as the northodox teachings the system of Hui Neng may be among Japanese Zen followers, on the Chinese mainland, at least up to the time of the People's Republic, the northern Ch!an of Shen-hsiu continued to be observed at such places as Mount Omeit despite the fact that this strain of Ch!an has been dismissed in Japan.
Emptiness encompasses everything; there is nothing that stands over against it. Emptiness excludes nothing and opposes nothing.
The true mark of emptiness is that it is essentially nothing, and yet it is the fullness of existence. It is the ground upon which all things come to be. It is a living emptiness. All appearances come about within it. Those who understand emptiness become compas sionate (maitn, karuna) And the example of Chrysostom at the same time shows that a "negative theology" can and indeed must arise, not only from the "infusion of Hellenistic speculation and native mysticism,1 1 but from purely and genuinely religious roots, namely, the experience of the numinous.44
The negative descriptions of Dionysius the Aeropagite, the unknowing (nescio) of Bernard, RuysbroeckT s "darkness into which all lovers lose themselves/1 the thought of Eckhart, are all devel opments that flow along this line. Eckhart awakens salvation through a philosophy of nothingness. In regard to "people who see
God," Ruysbroeck writes that !T their spirit is yet undivided and undifferentiated. Thus, apart from that unity they have no experi ence of anything else.1 15 This directly parallels non-discriminative wisdom (nirvikaIpajnana) in Mahayana Buddhism.
The doctrine that T T compassion-love， " as the basic quality of human conduct, is identical with "understanding" of the absolute is of course not limited solely to Buddhism. The Mahayana notion that wisdom and compassion are identified through practice is found in various arguments of Thomas Aquinas. He teaches that "only God is essentially good,"46 and that, at the same time as T T God loves all existing t h i n g s , "47 "the fullness of knowledge exists within God.lf48 Later Western thinkers treated this idea as norma tive and some even considered it to be an obvious fact.^9
In Dante^ Divine Comedy God is both love and knowledge, for the meaning of such love and such knowledge embraces the entire universe. But The Divine Comedy is poetic in style and does not express the unity of love and knowledge systematically.
Oh Light eternal who only in thyself abidest, only thyself dost understand and to thyself, self-understood self understanding, turnest love and smiling.
To the high fantasy here power failed; but already my desire and will were rolled-even as a wheel that moveth equally-by the love that moves the sun and the other stars.50
Beyond the widest of the circlying spheres A sigh which leaves my heart aspires to move.
A new celestial influence which Love
Bestows on it by virtue of his tears Impels it ever upwards. As it nears
Its goal of longing in the realms above 
